is subject to autocratic or oligarchical control. The stockholders do not vote -they sign proxies .... It is not diffcult for a small group of financiers to dominate properties worth billions of dollars belonging to thousands of investors, who have really no vote in their management. This power of control may occasionally be lost; the stockholders may revolt, or rival capitalists buy in, but in general it can be perpetuated."' Speaking in the Senate in 1908, Robert La Follette continued Pratt's argument: "the statement that the business of the country in a national sense is controlled by less than 100 men -by less than 50 men, aye by a mere handful of men, requires the citation of no authority further than the list of directors of transportation, industrial, and financial trusts, combinations, and corporations of the country. The official records of these institutions are in themselves the proof."8 Thirty years later, after examining the largest 250 American corporations, the National Resources Committee concluded that "it is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the corporate community, though not formally organized, does build up into significant and more or less interrelated interest groupings . . . . The main importance of the corporate community . . . lies in the controls exercised over the policies of the larger corporations, through them affecting the whole American economy." 9 Peter C. Dooley, using a corporate sample similar to that of the National Resources Committee, compared control in 1964 10 with that of 1935. He found: "The institution of the interlocking directorate is extensive and enduring. Most of the large corporations have been interlocked with other large corporations for many decades." 11 Finally, a 1969 Federal Trade Commission report on corporate mergers states that "The present study . . . provides voluminous evidence that the existing law on interlocking directorates is inadequate and that interlocks among our great corporations are especially inimical to competition because the economy has become increasingly concentrated among a few hundred corporations."12 Despite this extensive study, the phenomenon of interlocking directorates has yet to be cast in historical perspective. Dooley's For each year we ranked the largest industrials, rails, utilities, and banks by their capitalization. Capitalization was defined as the book value of issued stock plus funded debt at par. In the case of banks, funded debt was replaced by undivided surplus. Investment houses, chosen from the New York Stock Exchange Directory, were selected on the basis of notoriety as indicated in the literature of the period and in later studies.1" Data were reduced to punched cards and ranked by various computer routines.
An examination of contemporary sources indicates that our method of ranking by capitalization rather than by assets omitted few important corporations. In fact, asset value could not be used because most industrial corporations did not publish these data in the earlier years. Further, data that were published are highly suspect.xe Finally, we regressed assets on capitalization for fortyseven industrials and fifty railroads and found that our measure understates asset size by approximately 10 per cent.17
For 1935 1896  112  82  64  1899  170  21  21  1901  181  16  10  1905  184  21  2  1935  178  27  2  1985  184  23  0 Source: All tables are constructed from data in the authors' samples.
In Table 2 , we calculate the number of individuals directing the corporations included in our sample and distribute them by the number of positions held. Interestingly, the percentage holding only one position increased slightly from 1896 to 1964. More interesting is the overall percentage decline in individuals with multiple positions after 1905.
In Table 3 The number of interlocked companies might lead to the conclusion that the interlocking directorate has been used almost uniformly as a means of concentrating control throughout the twentieth century. As Table 1 reveals, the number of interlocked corporations remained within three of the 1901 level of 181 for every year examined thereafter. However, while the number of interlocked corporations remained virtually the same, the extent to which they were interconnected declined greatly. By 1964, the total number of interlocks among these companies fell to less than half its 1905 peak as shown in Table 5 locked to this extent. This absolute decline becomes even more noteworthy when it is observed that the total number of directorships available in these companies increased substantially over the period studied. If the proportion of directors holding multiple positions had remained constant from 1905 to 1964, then, ceteris paribus, the number of interlocks in 1964 would have been 4,400. Actually, only 1,551 interlocks are found, about a third of those expected. A final example of the decrease in the intensity of interlocking is found in Table 8 , which is self-explanatory. In summary, these tables show a clear, significant decrease in the intensity of corporate interlocking since 1905. We cannot isolate the cause with the information now available. But, unlike other research on the subject, this study includes periods both preceding and following the Clayton Act. The trends we have depicted seem consistent with the hypothesis that anti-interlock legislation did have some impact. Although the Clayton Act prohibitions were severely circumscribed and easily avoided, corporations were aware of their existence. We cannot positively demonstrate that legal activity made interlocking less attractive, but something altered the pattern of events. The flow toward corporate interlocking ceased and its use began to shrink. However, the above tables also reveal a substantial amount of corporate interlocking. Although the intensity with which the device is used has lessened, the interlocking directorate still persists as a means of concentrating economic control.28
DECLINE OF "PROMINENT INTERLOCKERS"
We have demonstrated that the intensity with which the top corporations were interlocked decreased dramatically from 1905 to 1964. However, we must still consider the question of a "financial oligarchy." Have its numbers and influence changed over time? Table 4 revealed the number of individuals in multiple positions. Although many of these individuals held but two offices, the table nevertheless indicated that a few persons occupied a relatively large number of positions. Indeed, some of these men were so prominent that they could, in the words of Pratt, be considered members of the American business senate. By 1964, this "senate" had apparently ceased to exist. Either prominent individuals were no longer involved with as many companies, or they were unwilling to let their power become apparent. In the latter case they may have used lieutenants to sit in their places to insure that their views were known.
These conclusions arise from an examination of all individuals holding four or more separate positions and the companies they interlocked.24 The most impressive manifestations of the decline of extreme multiple position holding can be seen in the second and fifth columns of Table 9 . Whereas individuals held as many as fifteen positions in 1905, no individual held even half that number in 1964.
An indication of the underlying motives for occupying multiple positions can be found in Table 10 where we determined the proportion of "prominent interlockers" involved in one or more sectors.25 Our results depict a predominance of intersectoral position 
